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I. INTRODUCTION 
This case involves an appeal of a jury verdict in favor of the respondent 
who was viciously attacked by a dog whom prior to the attack had been 
cited as dangerous/ dangerous dog by animal control. Appellants 
appealed the jury verdict against them on the theory that they were not 
custodians of the dog at the time of the attack and that their son as owner 
of the dog and as such was solely responsible for the attack. The jury held 
that the Appellants who had knowledge of the dangerous propensities of a 
dog, assumed the role of caretakers of the dog and failed to take steps to 
protect the public from the dangerous propensities of that dog were 
responsible for the damages as a result of the dog attacking innocent third 
parties. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
A jury verdict was entered against the Appellants, Mark and Robyn 
Munkhoff collectively the Munkhoffs, along with their adult son, Sam, for 
negligence in regards to an attack on Mr. Kummerling by a dog named "Bo". 
The appellants are not appealing the jury's verdict in favor of assessing that 
damage, but instead are appealing the denial of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to a negligence claim by the Kummerlings. Reference to the 
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"Kummerlings" hereinafter shall include both Plaintiffs, Klaus Kummerling 
and Baerbel Litke husband and wife. The Munkhoffs are also appealing the 
Order denying the Munkhoffs a new trial and request for remittitur under 
I.R.C.P. 59.1 and I.R.C.P. 60. Appellants' argue that this matter should not 
have gone to trial and the summary judgment should be granted on the 
basis that no genuine issue of material fact existed. As can be seen from the 
trial court's transcript and Affidavit of Officer Laurie Deus, there were 
substantial issues of material fact, which were disputed. In the end the jury 
believed the credibility of the Kummerlings and their version of events in 
regards to disputed facts. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Both the Respondents, Kummerlings and the Appellant Munkhoffs 
reside beside each other on Sutter's Way Street in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. (R 
64 ,r 4). In November, 2012 the Munkhoffs adult son, Sam Munkhoff (Sam) 
claimed ownership of a Pitbull named Bo. Sam adopted the Pitbull to avoid it 
being taken to the Kootenai County Animal Control. (TR Vol. II Page 230 11 
2-11). Sam lied to Animal Control and said the dog was his even though it 
was not. Bo, in November 2012, was found in an alley standing on top of a 
vehicle barking profusely. (R 79 ,r 1). The dog was threatening and 
aggressive. (R 79 ,r 1). Concerned about the danger to the public posed by 
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the dog; the dog was tasered. (R 79 ,r 5). Sam was cited for having an 
aggressive dog. (R 69 ,r C). 
Sam was provided a copy of the city ordinances with the requirements 
for maintaining an aggressive dog including fencing, muzzling and signage 
requirements on November 27, 2012. (R 79 ,r D). Officer Laurie Deus 
explained these requirements both to Sam and Mark Munkhoff at the 
Munkhoff's residence on Sutter's Way. (R 79-80 ,r D & E). Mark Munkhoff 
further affirmed that the dog would be contained there and was part of the 
family. (R 80 ,r E). The information provided to Sam and Mark Munkhoff 
indicated that if Bo was to stay anywhere else that animal control must be 
notified. Evidence and testimony at trial indicated that Bo continued to 
reside at the Munkhoff's through July 30, 2013 when Bo viciously attacked 
Mr. Kummerling in the driveway of his home. (R 73 ,r 6) (R 114 ,r 12). 
On the other hand the actual residences for Sam between November 
2012 and July 30, 2013 are disputed. Mr. Kummerling stated that Sam 
resided at the Munkhoff's for months before the attack. (R 112 ,r 4). Sam 
indicated he was living in Long Beach California (Tr Vol. II Page 237 11. 22-25 
and page 238 11. 1-9) and Spokane, Washington (R 73 ,r B) to Officer Deus (R 
98). He later admitted at trial that he lied to Officer Deus about living in 
California. (Tr Vol. II Page 230 11. 2-3). In regards to Sam's assertion that he 
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was living in the Spokane Valley in April 2013; Bo was cited for being a 
dangerous dog for biting a person in Coeur d'Alene at the same time. (R 98). 
Officer Deus drove by the Munkhoff home in December, 2012 and did not 
see any beware of dog signs posted on the property (R 91 ,r 3). 
On February 9, 2013, Bo was found running loose in the City of Coeur d' 
Alene by animal control officers. (R 98). He was picked up by animal control, 
returned to Sam and not cited. (Tr Vol. II Page 234 11.1 16 through page 256 
Line 25). 
On April 29, 2013, Bo was running loose in the vicinity of Munkhoffs 
home. (Tr Vol. II Page 235). Bo bit a person in that incident (Tr Vol. II Page 
234 11. 16 through Page 256 Line 25). Sam was cited for having a dangerous 
dog as a result of that incident. (Tr Vol. II Page 236 11. 1-4). The Munkhoffs 
dog, Dexter, was also running loose with Bo and cited by animal control. (Tr 
Vol. II Page 23611. 5-13). Though numerous attempts were made by animal 
control to serve Sam with the declaration of dangerous dog to sign; they were 
unsuccessful. (R 73 ,r 4(b)(c)). Mark Munkhoff told Officer Deus on two 
separate occasions in April and May of 2013 that Bo was not allowed on his 
property (R 93) and (R 94 ,r 4). 
In the months prior and up to the attack on Mr. Kummerling on July 
30, 2013, Sam was working in North Dakota (R 99 ,r 5) and (R 113 ,r 7). All 
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during this time the Munkhoffs were the sole caretakers of Bo and he stayed 
in their backyard (R 113 1 7). 
Despite the requirement of signage informing the public of a 
dangerous dog as required by Coeur d'Alene City none was ever placed on 
the Munkhoffs premises (R 99 1 5). Bo was never seen wearing a muzzle (R 
108 1 5). Robyn Munkhoff indicated Sam bought a muzzle for Bo but wasn't 
aware he was required to us it. (R99). 
The Kummerlings never saw any signage on the Munkhoffs property 
indicating the Munkhoffs had a dangerous dog (R 108 1 4) and (R 114 1 14). 
On July 30, 2013, Klaus Kummerling was sitting in his driveway when Sam, 
with Bo on a leash, approached on the sidewalk in front of the Kummerling 
home (Tr Vol. I Page 75). Mr. Kummerling asked Sam if it was okay to pet Bo 
(Tr Vol. I Page 75 11 13-24). As Mr. Kummerling bent down to reach out and 
pet Bo; Bo lunged at Mr. Kummerling biting him in the face and knocking 
him down in his driveway (Tr Vol. I Page 76). Mr. Kummerling suffered 
permanent and disfiguring injuries to his face. A portion of his lip was ripped 
off (Tr Vol. I Page 76 11 13-14). He suffered permanent nerve damage to the 
lip and chin area (Tr Vol. I Page 105 11 9-14). Immediately after the attack 
Sam left the area and took Bo with him (Tr Vol. II Page 241119-12). Robyn 
Munkhoff arrived at the scene and demanded that Bo be shot (Tr Vol. I Page 
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141 11 2-5). Mr. Kummer ling informed Officer Deus that if the Munkhoffs had 
posted dangerous dogs signs, he would not have attempted to pet Bo (R 99). 
C. Procedural History 
Klaus Kummerling and his wife, Barbara Baerbel Litke filed a 
Complaint in District Court, 1st Judicial District alleging claims for 
negligence, gross negligence, outrage, and nuisance against the City of Coeur 
d'Alene, Coeur d'Alene police chief, Ron Clark, Mark Munkhoff, Robyn 
Munkhoff and Sam Munkhoff (R 10-18). As a result of a Summary Judgment 
Motion filed by the City of Coeur d'Alene, the trial court dismissed the City of 
Coeur d'Alene and the Coeur d'Alene police chief, Ron Clark as defendants 
(R 210-228). The Munkhoffs also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
requesting dismissal of all the Kummerlings' claims (R 44-45). The trial court 
dismissed all claims except the negligence claims against the Munkhoffs (R 
189-209). Sam, who represented himself, did not join in the Summary 
Judgment Motion of the Munkhoffs. 
Trial was held on the matter before Judge Cynthia K. C. Meyer from 
September 19 through September 22, 2016. The jury, after deliberating, 
returned a verdict in the sum of $185,000.00 for non-economic damages and 
$16,603.00 in economic damages finding Sam Munkhoff 45% responsible, 
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Mark Munkhoff 40% responsible, Robyn Munkhoff 10% responsible and 
Klaus Kummerling 5% responsible. 
Subsequent to the jury verdict, the Munkoffs filed a Motion for 
remittitur and new trial on October 11, 2016 (R 410-418). After hearing on 
the matter, the trial court denied said motions pursuant to a memorandum 
decision (R 436-456). The Appellants filed this appeal on December 14, 
2016, (R 462-465) which was amended on January 31, 2017 (R 466-469) 
and subsequently again amended on February 28, 2017 (R 470-476). 
1. Munkhoff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
The Munkhoffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter 
on March 17, 2016 (R 44-45). The Munkhoffs, in their Motion, moved for an 
Order Granting Summary Judgment on Kummerling's claim of negligence, 
nuisance and outrage as stated in the Kummerling's third ca~se of action in 
the Complaint. Sam Munkhoff, who wa Pro Se, did not file a motion for 
summary judgment nor did he join in the Munkhoff's Motion. On May 17, 
2016, the trial court filed a Memorandum Decision in regards to the 
Munkhoff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R 168-188). An Amended 
Memorandum Decision was filed by the trial court with the corrections to 
specifically page 14 on May 18, 2016 (R 189-209). In that decision the trial 
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court dismissed Kummerling's claims of outrage and nuisance but denied 
the Munkhoff's Motion to dismiss the Kummerling's claims of negligence. 
2. Trial 
The case was tried to a jury on September 19, 2016 through 
September 22, 2016. The sole issue was whether the Defendants were 
negligent in allowing the dog, Bo to attack Mr. Kummerling and that 
negligence was a proximate cause of the Kummerling's damages. Sam 
Munkhoff appeared Pro Se. The jury ultimately found in favor of 
Kummerling in which he was awarded $16,603.00 in economic damages 
and $185,000.00 in non-economic damages. The fault by jury verdict was 
allocated as follows: Sam Munkhoff 45%, Mark Munkhoff 45%, Robin 
Munkoff 10% and Klaus Kummer ling 5%. 
3. Motion for Remittitur and New Trial 
Munkhoffs filed a Motion for Remittitur for a New Trial on October 11, 
2016 (R 410-418). In the Motion for New Trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), 
the Munkhoffs alleged three basis'. The first was an irregularity in the 
proceedings by an adverse party. The Munkhoffs alleged that Klaus 
Kummerling, who was hard of hearing, "faked" his hearing loss when he 
requested an assisted hearing device from the court (R 407-408) and (R 412). 
The Munkhoffs alleged that Mr. Kummerling was not hard of hearing when 
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asking to pet the dog, Bo on July 30, 2016, but somehow at the time of trial, 
a little over a year later, indicated he had trouble hearing (R 410-418). In 
actuality Mr. Kummerling had suffered a medical condition between July 30, 
2016 and the trial date, which caused a severe and permanent hearing loss 
(R 419-420) and (R 423-425). These facts were unrebutted by Munkhoffs. 
The Munkhoffs also requested a new trial based upon excessive 
damages citing I. C. § 6-807(1)(2) (R 412-414). The trial court found that in 
relationship to the horrific damages suffered by Mr. Kummerling that the 
damages were not excessive and were reasonable (R 436-456). The jury 
found that the actions or inactions of the Munkhoffs constituted negligence 
and in part ere a proximate cause of the injuries to Mr. Kummerling. The 
court denied the Munkhoffs motion finding no excessive verdict and no 
basis for remittitur or a new trial (R 436-456). On November 7, 2016, the 
Judgment on Special Verdict against Mark Munkhoff in the amount of 
$77,243.30, Robin Munkhoff in the amount of $19,310.82 and Sam 
Munkhoff in the amount of $86,898.71 was entered (R 477-478). 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Were the Munkhoffs negligent in their caretaking of Bo and did such 
negligence proximately cause Mr. Kummerling's injuries? 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court correctly denied the Munkhoff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment regarding Kummerling's negligence 
claim because the Kummerlings raised genuine issues of fact 
as to Munkhoff's duty and proximate cause. 
There were a number of factual disputes at the time of summary 
judgment including the extent and nature of care and control that the 
Munkhoffs exercised over the dog Bo. Also, disputes of facts arose at the 
time of summary judgment as to the Munhoffs knowledge of the vicious 
propensities of Bo. Finally, there were genuine issues of material fact 
regarding Munkhoff's compliance with Coeur d'Alene City Ordinances in 
order to protect the public, which required appropriate signage, fencing and 
muzzling of Bo. The Munkhoffs throughout have dismissed any 
responsibility for the acts of Bo, despite evidence which demonstrated that 
Bo continually resided in their home from November 2012 to July 30, 2013 
when the attack occurred. Evidence about the time of Summary Judgment 
also demonstrated the Munkhoffs were aware of the requirements of housing 
a dangerous, aggressive dog and agreed to adhere to those requirements, i.e. 
muzzling, signage ect ... but failed to do so. Certainly no injury to Mr. 
Kummerling would ever have occurred had the Munkhoffs followed their 
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duty imposed, not only by ordinance, but my common law to protect the 
innocent third parties from attacks by a dog with known vicious propensities 
1. Standard of Review on Motion for Summary Judgment 
I.R.C.P. 56(c) provide that "The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
The Munhoffs have the burden of proof to show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact with regard to the Kurnmerling's claim Chandler v. 
Hayden, 147 Idaho 765 (2009). The Appellate Court standard of review of a 
denial of Summary Judgment is the same as the Trial Court Thomson v. 
Idaho Insurance Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530 887 P.2d 1034, 1037 
( 1994). All facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the nonmoving party 
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts are to be in 
favor of the non-moving party Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541 808 
P.2d 876, 878 (1991). The material issues of fact in this case involved the 
Munkhoffs allegations that they had no care, control, or involvement with 
the dog, Bo, or knowledge of Bo's vicious propensities. 
The trial court correctly determined that the evidence, when construed 
in the light most favorable to the Kummerlings, presented genuine issues of 
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material fact and/or demonstrated that the Munkhoffs were not entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228 
159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007). One of the major issues in this case was the 
credibility of the witnesses. Where there is a conflict in evidence; a 
determination should not be made on summary judgment if the credibility 
can be tested by testimony in a court of trial before the trier of fact. Argyle v. 
Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668 691 P.2 1283 (Ct. App. 1984). The issues of 
credibility in this case were very important as can be seen by the Trial 
Court's Memorandum denying a new trial in this matter (R 44 7 -449). There 
were genuine issues of material fact as to when, where, what times and 
under what conditions Bo was kept at the Munkhoff home and the extent of 
the Munkhoffs caregiving duties. 
2. The Munkhoffs breach their duty to Mr. Kummerling because not 
only were they custodians of Bo; they were care keeper and 
harborers of Bo. 
There is no distinction between custodian and owner of an aggressive 
or dangerous dog pursuant to Coeur d'Alene City Ordinances 6.20.030 and 
6.20.040 (R 82-89). These ordinances specifically mention not only the 
owner but also the custodian of the dog are responsible for harboring an 
aggressive or dangerous animal and are bound by the requirements of 
appropriate signage, fencing and muzzling of the aggressive/ dangerous dog. 
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The Munkhoffs agreed to keep the dog at their home and abide by the 
City of Coeur d' Alene's Ordinances regarding aggressive, dangerous dogs. 
The Munkhoffs knew the dog was aggressive/ dangerous. The dog 
predominantly resided at the Munkhoffs. They were aware or should have 
been aware of the fact that Bo was declared aggressive on November 27, 
2012, when found running loose near their home in February, 2013, bit 
another person on April 9, 2017 and still kept the dog at their home without 
proper signage or muzzling. They assumed the duty and responsibility by 
taking all these actions. 
a. The Munkhoffs had complete care, custody and control 
of the dog, Bo and despite that custody failed to take 
reasonable steps to protect Mr. Kummerling 
Both under Idaho law, common law and statute, custodians have a 
duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury if they are aware of the 
dangerous propensities of the dog Braese v. Stinker Stores, Inc. 157 Idaho 
443, 337 P.3d 602 (2014). Coeur d'Alene City Ordinance 6.20.030 and 
Coeur d'Alene City Ordinance 6.20.040, I.C. § 25-2805(2). The Munkhoffs 
were custodians of Bo in that they housed, fed, and cared for him while he 
resided at their premises from November, 2012 through July 30, 2013. 
Those actions to the ordinary person would make them appear to be the 
owner as well. 
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While there are no definitions of custodian either under the Coeur d' 
Alene City Ordinance or Idaho Statute pertinent to animals; the dictionary 
definition of custodian is "One who has care of something as of the exhibits 
in a museum, a caretaker or keeper''. The definition of custody is "a keeping 
safe or guarding; care; protection; guardianship" Webster's New Universal 
Abridged Dictionary 2nd Edition (1983). The definitions clearly fit the 
relationship that the Munkhoffs had with the Bo. Sam himself acknowledged 
that the Munkhoffs would be better custodians of Bo and that he should be 
kept at their house (R 69 ,r B). 
The Munkhoff's argue that the mere walking of a dangerous dog is 
sufficient to terminate any legal responsibilities the custodians and 
caregivers of that dog might have. The Munkhoffs cite McClain v. Lewiston 
Interstate Fair and Racing Ass'n, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015, (1909) for the 
proposition that a family member taking a dog out in public relieves the 
owner and/ or custodian for harm the dog causes while in public. In McClain 
the court determined that if a person was an owner or caretaker in control of 
such animal was a question of fact to be determined by the jury McClain at 
1027. The Munkhoffs have cited Georgia, Illinois and Wisconsin cases for the 
proposition that a person who keeps a dog and allows a third party to take 
control of it is not responsible for the damage the dog might cause. This is 
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not the law of Idaho nor are these Idaho cases. More importantly all five of 
these cases are inapplicable to the preset case, as the dogs involved were not 
previously adjudged aggressive or dangerous nor did any of the 
custodians/owners assume a duty under statute or ordinance to take steps 
to protect the dog from injuring persons. Steps such as muzzling and 
signage is the case in this appeal. There is no evidence that the 
owners/custodians the dogs mentioned in those out-of-state cases were 
required to fence, muzzle and provide adequate signage to inform the public 
and protect the public as is the case here. 
b. The Munkhoffs had a duty because they specifically 
undertook the responsibility to house Bo consistent 
with Coeur d'Alene City Ordinances 
This case does not involve a set of facts where Bo was visiting the 
Munkhoffs and Sam decided to take Bo for a walk resulting in the injury. Bo 
resided at the Munhoffs. He was cared for by the Munkhoffs. The Munkhoffs 
assumed this responsibility or undertaking by acknowledging the 
requirements of the city ordinances regarding fencing, muzzling and signage 
and affirmatively indicated that they would comply with those requirements. 
A Prima Facia case of negligence requires that a plaintiff must establish "1). 
A duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain 
standard of conduct; 2). A breach of that duty; 3). A casual connection 
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between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and 4). Actual 
loss or damage" Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669, 672 
( 1999). In Braese, the court indicated "A store owner would also have a duty 
to protect patrons from a dog that the store owner knew or should have 
known of the animals vicious or dangerous propensities Braese at 446. The 
Munkhoffs were well aware of the dangerous propensities of the dog. Or at 
least a question of fact arose as to those dangerous propensities. A person 
who keeps, harbors or otherwise has custody of a dog is required to exercise 
proper judgment in the control of that dog. See McClain supra. The 
Munkhoffs once they assumed the duty of harboring the dog are responsible 
for any foreseeable damage that can be caused by the aggressive, dangerous 
dog, in this case, Bo. The Munkhoffs breached that duty by failing to have 
proper signage informing the public including Mr. Kummerling of the 
dangerousness of the dog and/ or allowing the dog to be in public without a 
muzzle. 
The casual connection, which is a third requirement of negligence for 
summary judgment purposes was met in that had the dog been muzzled or 
had adequate precautions been made regarding the signage or simply had 
the Munkhoffs refused to house the dog, Mr. Kummerling would not have 
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been injured. The fourth element, which is the actual loss or damage is 
evident by the injuries suffered by Mr. Kummerling to his face. 
c. All the arguments raised in Munkhoffs appeal of the 
summary judgment involve questions of fact, which 
were disputed at the time of the hearing. 
The Munkhoffs have argued that they have no duty to protect Mr. 
Kummerling from Bo. These duties arrive in large part and are determined 
by what Kummerling knew as well as the Munkhoffs regarding the 
dangerous propensities of Bo. The factual circumstances surrounding that 
case are relevant for determining that duty i.e. what each person knew and 
what steps did he take. Those were factual issues which were disputed at the 
time of the summary judgment hearing. The factual issues of custody, 
compliance with the Coeur d'Alene City Ordinance regarding signage and 
muzzling as well as whether the Munkhoffs affirmatively undertook the duty 
to care for the dog are all questions of fact and not subject to dismissal at 
summary judgment. The issue of negligence itself is more appropriate for a 
jury to determine than to be decided at summary judgment. "It is for the jury 
to decide what a reasonably careful person would do under circumstances 
shown by the evidence." Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 890 749 P.2d 
1012, 1015 (1988). 
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The Munkhoffs cite Stoddart v. Pocatello School District No. 25, 149 
Idaho 679, 239 P.3d 784 (2010) for the premise that injuries which occur by 
an instrumentality off the defendant's property relieves him of liability. 
However, in Stoddart the issue was one of foreseeability in that it was not 
foreseeable that a child would be murdered. Also, contrary to the case at 
hand, in Stoddart there were no specific statutory provisions that the school 
had violated. In this case there were specific restrictions as a condition of 
keeping the dog, which the Munkhoffs ignored. Consequently a question of 
fact regarding negligence remained after summary judgment, which was for 
the jury to resolve. 
d. It was foreseeable that damage would result to third 
parties if the Munkhoffs continued to harbor Bo 
without taking precautions to protect the public 
Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554 348, P.2d 497 (Ct. App. 2015) stands 
for the proposition that in a dog bite case, especially involving an animal that 
had previous incidents, dismissal of a negligence claim at summary 
judgment is inappropriate. The issue of whether a duty occurs in large part 
is based upon whether the harm was foreseeable Turpen v. Granieri, supra. 
Foreseeability is a question of fact, which precludes entry of a summary 
judgment. Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 411 P.2d 768 (1966). Whether 
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liability attaches and a duty exists is in large part foreseeability of the injury 
depends on the degree of harm and the effort to prevent it. Where the degree 
of the result of harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low 
degree of foreseeability is required Turpen 133 Idaho at 248. Foreseeability 
also relates to the size of the harm rather than the specific mechanism of the 
injury Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 506 (1990). 
The issue at summary judgment is whether sufficient facts disputed or not 
exist take to the jury. It is within the province of the jury to determine 
whether the harboring of Bo would lead to injury to innocent persons. 
The Munkhoffs acknowledge in page 23 of their Brief that it was 
foreseeable that Sam would walk Bo while he was visiting the Munkhoffs. It 
is also foreseeable that if the dog was allowed to walk without a muzzle and 
was approached by someone in a nonthreatening manner, that person could 
be attacked. 
3. The Munkhoffs harboring of Bo and failure to abide by signage and 
muzzling requirements was a proximate cause of Mr. Kummerling's 
m1unes. 
The Munkhoffs argue that there is no proximate cause link between 
any duty the Munkhoffs may have had of reasonable care that resulted in 
injuries to Mr. Kummerling. Proximate cause is a question of fact. Cramer v. 
Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875, 204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009). There can be more 
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than one proximate cause of the injury complained of, which can result in 
liability to the defendant. Unrelated tortious acts of different defendants can 
occur as proximate causes of an injury Lindhartsen v. Myler, 91 Idaho 269, 
272, 420 P.2d 259, 262(1966). 
There were sufficient facts before the court to survive summary 
judgment regarding proximate cause. True proximate cause focuses on 
whether legal policy supports responsibility being "extended to the 
consequences of conduct ... (it) determines whether liability for that 
conduct attaches." Henderson v. Comico, Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 695, 518 P.2d 
873, 878 (1973). If the Munkhoffs actions in harboring the dog, failure to 
muzzle and failing to provide adequate signage was reasonably foreseeable 
as a natural probable consequence of the defendant's conduct, then liability 
attaches. Doe 1 v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 895 P.2d 
1229, Ct. App. (1995). 
a. The failure of signage is a breach of the ordinance and constitutes a 
genuine issue of fact. 
Whether the signage caused, in part, the damage to Mr. Kummerling is a 
question of fact. If the Munkhoffs violated any of the City of Coeur d' Alene's 
Ordinances, which is undisputed they did, such violation constitutes 
negligence Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 
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( 1986). Establishing negligence per se through violation of statute is to 
conclusively establish the first two elements of a cause of action in 
negligence, (duty and breach) Slade v. Smith's Management Corp., 119 Idaho 
482, 489, 808 P.2d 401, 408 (1991). 
b. The walking of Bo by Sam did not constitute the superseding cause, 
which would relieve the Munkhoffs from liability. 
A superseding cause is an act of a third person or force, which by its 
intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another, which 
is antecedent negligence is substantial fact of bringing about Lundy v. 
Hazen, 90 Idaho 323,329 411 P.2d 768,771 (1966). Sam's actions in 
walking the dog were not a superseding cause because it was reasonably 
foreseeable. 
The Restatement Second of Torts Section 42 ( 1965) provides the 
following guidelines to determine whether an act is a superseding cause: (a) 
The fact that the intervention brings about harm different in kind from 
which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence; (b) The fact 
that its operation of or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be 
extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at 
the time of its operation; (c) The fact that the intervening force is operating 
independently of any situation created by the actor's negligence, or, on the 
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other hand is or is not a normal relief result of such situation; (d) The fact 
that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act or 
his failure to act; (e) The fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a 
third person, which is wrongful towards the other and as such subjects the 
third person to liability to him; (f) The degree of culpability of a wrongful act 
of a third person, which sets the intervening force in motion. The Plaintiffs 
did argue at the time of hearing that if Defendants had posted warning signs, 
Mr. Kummerling would not have tried to pet the dog. Also, if Bo had been 
muzzled, the injury would not have occurred. Applying the above referenced 
factors of the restatement, it is clear that Sam's walking Bo was not a 
superseding factor to eliminate responsibility of the Munkhoffs. 
It is clearly foreseeable that the dog whether by Sam, or otherwise, 
would be walked. Mr. Kummerling would not have attempted to pet Bo if he 
aware that dangerous dog signs had been posted on the Munkhoff's property 
(R 100). The requirements of foreseeability have been met by the 
Kummerlings. l)The Munkhoffs were aware of the dog's 
aggressive/ dangerous propensities; 2) The Munkhoffs were aware of steps 
that were necessary to address the aggressive/ dangerous propensities of the 
dog and keep the dog on their premises but failed to do so; 3) It was 
foreseeable that if the Munkhoffs did not address those issues regarding 
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muzzling, harboring an aggressive dangerous dog and/ or fencing, the dog 
could in fact harm someone; and 4) It was foreseeable that Sam would take 
the dog for a walk and the dog could possibly bite someone during that walk 
if not muzzled. 
Acts of negligence whether joint or independent of each other can both 
cause the proximate cause of an injury Valles v. Union Pacific Railroad, Co., 
72 Idaho 231, 238-239, 238 P.2d 1154, 1161-1162 (1951). Before an 
intervening superseding cause of an accident can become the sole proximate 
cause of the injury and thus relieve the first negligent wrong doer of liability, 
such subsequent cause must have been unforeseen, unanticipated and not a 
probable consequence of the original negligence. Lundy v. Hazen at 330 
citing Dewey v. Keller, 86 Idaho 506, 388 P.2d 988 (1964). The Munkhoffs 
argue that the lack of signage and/ or muzzling was not a direct or actual 
cause of Mr. Kummerling's injuries. Actual cause is whether a particular 
event produced a particular consequence Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 
284, 288, 127 P.3d 187, 191 (2005). The issues with the signage is simply 
answered by the fact that Mr. Kummerling would not have attempted to pet 
the dog or come near it if he was aware that the dog had been declared 
dangerous and had been notified by adequate signage on the Munkhoff 
home. In regards to the muzzling, if Mr. Kummerling had seen the muzzle on 
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the dog, first of all that would have put him on notice that there was some 
dangerous propensities with the dog and secondly, the dog would not have 
been able to attack him. 
B. The trial court's denial of the Munkhoff's motion for a new trial 
and remittitur were appropriate 
The Munkhoffs filed a motion for new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
59(a)(l)(A), (F), (G), 60(b)(3) and I.C. § 6-807. (R 410-418) A motion for 
remitter under I.R.C.P. 59.1 also was filed by the Munkhoffs. (R 410-418) 
The Munkhoffs requested, in their Appellate Brief, relief pursuant to I.R.C.P 
60(b)(6). No such request was made at the motion for new trial and therefore 
relief under that provision on the appellate level is inappropriate. (R 410-
418) 
The basis for the I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l)(A) and 60(b)(3) motions for new trial 
by the Munkhoffs was an unsubstantiated claim that Mr. Kummerling 
misrepresented to the court and jury at the time of trial, the extent of his 
hearing problems (R 412 ,i A and R 416-417 R 407-409). Mr. Kummerling 
used a hearing aided device provided by the court during the trial. (R420 ,i 4) 
Uncontroverted declarations and or affidavits of Mr. Kummerling (R 419-
420), Baerbel Litke (R 422-423) and Kummerlings' attorney Larry J. Kuznetz 
(R 425-427) confirmed that Mr. Kummerling's hearing loss was substantial, 
Page 24 
very real, and occurred after the dog attack and prior to trial. Consequently 
the Munkhoffs, for appellate purposes have failed to preserve and or present 
a claim for new trial under I.R.C.P. 60. 
1. Standard of Review 
The standard applicable to the trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
new trial under I.C.R.P. 59(a) is an abuse of discretion standard. Burggraf v. 
Chaffin, 121 Idaho 171,173 823 P.2d 775 (1991). That abuse of discretion 
must be manifest Pratton v Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840 P.2d 392, 
394( 1992). The reason for this standard is that the trial court is best capable 
to weigh the demeanor, credibility, and testimony of the witnesses and 
evidence overall. Quick v Crane 111 Idaho 759, 770, 727 P.2d 1187, 1198 
( 1986). To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, the 
appellate court is to consider whether it correctly perceived the issue as 
discretion, whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistent with legal standards, and whether it reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 56, 44 P.3d 1108, 1111 
(2002). 
2. The jury award was appropriate and not excessive. 
The Munkhoffs have abandoned their appeal of the trial court's ruling 
denying their request for a new trial based upon irregularity by an adverse 
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party under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l)(A) and fraud or misrepresentation pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). That leaves their appeal for a new trial claims based upon 
I.C. § 6-807 and I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l)(F) regarding excessive damages and I.R.C.P. 
59(a)(l)(G) regarding insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. 
As a general rule it is the jury's function to set the damage award 
based upon its sense of fairness and justice Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 
769,727 P.2d 1187, 1197 (1986). A verdict should only be overturned by a 
trial judge in very limited cases. Hei v. Holzer, 145 Idaho 563, 181P.3d. 489, 
(2008). Respondents have not found any Idaho case affirming the trial 
court's discretion to overrule jury verdict in favor of a Plaintiff. For this court 
at this juncture to overrule the jury's decision would be a manifest abuse of 
discretion and invade the province of a jury. 
The power of the court over excessive damages exists only when the 
facts are such that excess appears as a matter of law or such as to suggest, 
at first blush passion prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury Blaine 
v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 671, 429 P.2d 397, 403 (1967). To overrule a jury 
decision, an award must shock the conscience of the trial judge and lead the 
trial judge to conclude it would be unconscionable to let the damage award 
by the jury stand. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 ID 620, 625, 603 P.2d 575, 580 
( 1979). The jury award in this case did not shock the conscience of the trial 
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judge. The trial judge in a lengthy memorandum decision outlined in detail 
the reasons for the denial of the Munkhoffs motion for new trial. (R 436-
455). In that decision the trial court stated the disparity between the jury's 
allocation and the court's allocation certainly does not shock the conscience 
of the court but instead convinces the court of the reasonableness of the 
jury's allocation and that it was not based upon passion or prejudice (R 452-
453). The fact the amount the jury awarded and what the trial judge would 
have awarded is evidence itself of lack of passion or prejudice. In regard to 
the allocation of fault; the Trial Court stated, "With respect to the jury's 
allocation of fault, the Court has considered how it would have allocated 
fault based upon the evidence and it finds that the jury's allocation and the 
Court's allocation are very close" (R 452-453). 
The Munkhoffs have argued in their appeal that the trial court 
inappropriately applied the two-pronged test stated in Robertson v. Richards, 
115 Idaho 628, 769 P.2d 505 (1989) citing Blaine v Byers 91 Idaho 665, 429 
P.2d 397 (1967). In the present case, the trial court, after weighing all the 
evidence and determining the credibility of the witnesses, determined that 
the jury award was reasonable. The trial court took pains to address the 
credibility of the witnesses in its' memorandum decision denying the 
Munkhoffs' motion for new trial. The trial court found the plaintiffs', Mr. 
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Kummerling and Ms. Litke, to be credible. (R 44 7). The trial court found Sam 
Munkhoff to lack credibility. (R 44 7-448) "The Court also found Mark 
Munkhoff, and, to a lesser extent, Robyn Munkhoff, to lack credibility''. (R 
448) The trial court did satisfy the second prong of the test cited in Blaine 
and Robertson directing the court to consider whether probably a different 
result would occur in retrial. The trial court did consider this prong and 
basically stated it was in agreement with both the jury award and allocation 
of fault negating the probability of a different result at a new triaL 
3. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict and the 
denial of the motion for a new trial was appropriate. 
The Munkhoffs state that there is no evidence showing the Munkhoffs 
were custodians of Bo at the time of attack. The following evidence 
demonstrates that the Munkhoffs had care, control and custody of Bo at the 
time of attack: 
a. Sam acknowledged on November, 27 2012, when he met Officer Laurie 
Deus at the Munkhoffs home, that Bo would be housed there. (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 207 11 2-6). 
b. Based upon discussions with Mark Munkhoff on November 27, 2012, 
Officer Deus believed Bo would be housed at the Munkhoff's home.(Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 208 11. 6-25) 
Page 28 
c. Officer Deus indicated on the declaration of aggressive dog citation 
regarding the November, 2012 incident with Bo that the address where 
the dog would be housed was the Munkhoffs home at 3810 Sutters 
Way. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 21111. 1-11) 
d. Mark Munkhoff indicated to Officer Deus on November 27, 2012 that 
Bo would be staying at his home. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 214, 11. 12-22. Mark 
Munkhoff also stated he would contain the dog and the dog was part 
of the family, (R 71-72 1 E) 
e. Officer Deus reviewed the require men ts for keeping an aggressive dog 
including fencing, signage and muzzling with both Sam and Mark 
Munkhoff on November 27, 2012 and Mark Munhoff verbally agreed to 
those conditions. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 215 11. 2-9) 
f. The dog, Bo, was residing at the Munkhoff's home on April 30, 2013 
when he attacked another person.(Tr. Vol. II, page 219 11. 24-25 and 
page 220 11. 1-2) 
g. Officer Deus testified that once a dog has been declared aggressive or 
dangerous; the owner or custodian must notify the City of Coeur d' 
Alene where the dog is residing, including any changes in residence. 
(Tr. Vol. II, page 199 11. 14-20. No residence addresses for the location 
of Bo were provided to Officer Deus other than the Munkhoffs home. 
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h. Sam Munkhoff testified Bo and the Munkhoff's dog "Baxter" were 
running loose on April 29, 2013, after escaping the Munkhoff's yard. 
(Tr.Vol. II, page 236 11. 2-22. In this incident Bo bit a third party and 
was cited as a dangerous dog. (Tr. Vol. II, page 235 11. 
1. Bo was also found running loose in Coeur d'Alene in February of 2013 
but was not cited. (Tr.Vol. II, page 234 11. 16-24) 
J. Mark Munkhoff falsely indicated to Officer Deus on April 30, 2013 and 
May 3, 2013, that Bo was not allowed on his premises but stated "if the 
dog shows up, he will shoot it" (R 93) and (R 94 ,r 4). He also indicated 
on May 3, 201.3 that Sam was not allowed to move back in the 
Munkhoff's home R 94 ,r 4) 
k. Robyn Munkhoff told Officer Deus immediately after the attack that 
Sam had been working in North Dakota the last few months and Bo 
had "been living in our backyard the whole time Sam had been in North 
Dakota" (R 99 ,r 5). 
1. Bo had been residing at the Munkhoffs residence a number of months 
prior to the attack according to Mr. Kummerling (R 112 ,r 6). 
m. Mark and Robyn Munkhoff had been the sole custodians of Bo while 
Sam was in North Dakota (R 113 ,r 7). 
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n. The Munkhoffs admitted Bo was allowed to stay with them (R 64 ,r 3). 
and was staying with them at the time of the attack on July 30, 2013 
(R 65 ,r 5). 
o. Sam lied to Officer Deus when he told her that he and Bo were residing 
in the Long Beach, California, area sometime between November, 2012 
and July 30, 2013. (Tr. Vol. II. Page 222 11. 22-25 and page 238 11.1-5) 
p. According to Sam, he was working in North Dakota from July 5, 2013 
through the end of August, 2013, while Bo was still residing at the 
Munkhoff's home. (Tr. Vol. II. page 238 11. 17-25 and page 239 11. 1-12). 
Contrary to this Robyn Munkhoff stated to Officer Deus that Sam had 
been working in North Dakota the last few months prior to the attack 
(R 112 ,r 6) 
q. Bo was a 65 pound pit bull who was solid muscle and Sam was 
concerned it wasn't safe for his mother to walk the dog. (Tr. Vol. II. 
Page 243 11. 7 -12) 
r. Sam admitted he lied to protect Bo. (Tr. Vol. II. Page 243 11. 13-15) 
s. Mark Munkhoff told Officer Deus that "he agreed to contain the dog in 
my yard". (Tr. Vol. II, page 255 11. 23-25, and page 256 line 1.) 
t. Mark Munkhoff testified that he was the primary caregiver for Bo in 
July of 2013. (Tr. Vol. II, page 267 11. 3-7.) 
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u. Robyn Munkhoff fed and watered Bo in July of 2013. (Tr. Vol. II, page 
281 11 20-25.) 
v. Robyn Munkhoff could not provide any addresses for where Sam and 
Bo allegedly lived from November, 2012 thru July 30, 2013. (Tr. Vol. II, 
page 279 11.18-25, and page 280 11. 1-4.) 
w. Robyn Munkhoff told Mr. Kummerling that she was taking care of Bo 
and suggested Mr. Kummerling spray the fence to stop Bo from 
jumping on it. (Tr. Vol. I, page 70 11.213-25 and page 7111. 1-15.) 
x. Mr. Kummerling did not see a beware of dog sign posted on the 
Munkhoff's property prior to and up until the time he was attacked. 
(Tr. Vol. I, page 72 11. 23-25, and page 73 11.1-7.) 
y. Robyn Munkhoff indicated if her dog bit someone she would take 
precautions that she needed to. Tr. Vol. III, page 372 11. 8-15.) 
z. Officer Deus did not see a beware of a dog sign on the Munkhoff 
property either in December 2012 or at the time of the attack on July 
30, 2013 (R81 ,r 3) (R99 ,r 5). 
aa. Sam told Officer Deus that it would be better if Bo stayed at the 
Munkhoff's home (R 80 ,r 3). 
There is more than substantial evidence that the Munkhoffs were the 
caretakers of Bo, and that Bo resided at the Munkhoff's home at the time of 
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the attack on Mr. Kummerling. This combined with the lack of credibility of 
all the defendants supports the jury verdict in this matter. A jury verdict 
must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value 
that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of the 
jury April Beguesse Inc. v Rammell, 156 Idaho 500, 509, 328 P.3d 480, 489 
(2014). The jury's verdict on factual issues will generally not be disturbed on 
appeal McKim v Horner, 143 Idaho 568, 572, 149 P3d 843, 847 (2006). 
4. The Munkhoff's motion for a new trial filed with the trial court does 
not raise an issue regarding the custodian of Bo. 
The word custodian is never used in the Munkhoff's Motion for New 
Trial (R 410-418). That issue is raised for the first time on appeal. The 
Munkhoffs in their motion for new trial only indicated under I.C.R.P. 
59(a)(l)(G) that there was insufficient evidence to find the Munkhoffs 
responsible. They did not indicate that there was insufficient evidence to find 
that the Munkhoffs were custodians or that Sam was not the sole custodian; 
but just a vague reference to the fact that Robin Munkhoff should not have 
the percentage ofliability attached to her (R 414-416). The Munkhoffs 
admitted that the evidence justified placing some responsibility on Mark 
Munkhoff (R 415-416). In the Munkhoffs' motion for new trial they did not 
allege that it was improper for the jury to hold Mark Munkhoff responsible; 
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they merely asserted the percentage of allocation of fault to him was 
inappropriate (R 414-416). 
There is no evidence that the jury was confused regarding the concept 
of custodian and owner. Contrary to the assertion of the Munkhoffs under 
City of Coeur d'Alene Ordinance, a custodian as well as the owner of an 
aggressive, dangerous dog can be held responsible for the action of that dog 
(R 83-88). 
5. The trial court's denial of the Munkhoffs motion for remittitur and 
pursuant to I.C. § 6-807 was appropriate. 
Respondents herein reallege the same arguments for denial of the 
motion for remittitur and pursuant to I.C. § 6-807 as contained in the 
argument for new trial in paragraph IV, B, 3 above. Whether remittitur or 
additur; The Supreme Court of Idaho has previously stated it will not 
overrule the trial court concerning request for a new trial pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 59 where the trial court did not abuse its discretion and where the 
trial court stated the reasons for its ruling with sufficient particularity. 
Tuttle v Wayment Farms Inc. 131 Idaho 105, 107, 952 P2d 1241, 1243 
(1998). 
The trial court in its Amended Memorandum Decision and Order 
Denying the Munkhoffs motion for New Trial and Remittitur specifically 
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addressed the four criteria of I.C. § 6-807 and found that 1) the jury verdict 
was supported by the evidence, including the fact the court would have come 
to the same conclusion and allocate the liability similar to the jury verdict (R 
449); 2) the damage to Mr. Kummerling was severe and commensurate with 
the damages awarded, and did not shock the conscience of the court (R 449, 
452); 3) there was no fact or legal error during the presentation of evidence 
(R 451-452); and 4) the award was not a result of passion or prejudice (R 
445-449) Hei v Holzer at page 568-569 and 494-495. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Kummerlings request the court affirm 
the decision of the trial court and deny the Munkhoffs request to overturn 
the trial court's decision on Summary Judgment Motion and the Motion for 
Remittitur of New Trial. 
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